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Abstract Innovation, Virtual Ideas,
and Artificial Legal Thought
ANDREW C. MICHAELS*
INTRODUCTION
In the Silicon Valley culture of tech-triumphalism,1 it is often
assumed that advances in technology are necessarily
“making the world a better place,” 2 though in reality
technology can have both positive and negative effects. 3
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The
author thanks the Maryland Journal of Business & Technology Law for
its excellent Spring 2018 symposium on “Virtual Legality,” out of which
this article in part developed, and the editors of this journal for their
judicious editing and publishing work. The author also thanks Paul
Janicke and those who participated in the 2018 Mid-Atlantic Junior
Faculty at the University of Richmond School of Law, the same year’s
Patcon 8 conference at the University of San Diego School of Law, the
2018 IP Scholars Conference at UC Berkeley School of Law, and the 2018
IP Scholars Roundtable at Texas A&M University School of Law.
1
See SHANNON VALLOR, TECHNOLOGY AND THE VIRTUES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDE TO A FUTURE WORTH WANTING 126 (2016) (“we can
no longer afford the modern illusion that our technosocial innovations are
conductive to human mastery”); see also KENTARO TOYAMA, GEEK HERESY:
RESCUING SOCIAL CHANGE FROM THE CULT OF TECHNOLOGY x (2015)
(“World leaders are convinced that technology will make the world a
better place. But does technology really cause positive social change?”).
2 See, e.g., Andrew Marantz, How Silicon Valley Nails Silicon Valley, THE
NEW YORKER (June 9, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culturedesk/how-silicon-valley-nails-silicon-valley); Dov Greenbaum, Making
Law School A Better Place: Using HBO’s Silicon Valley to Teach
Intellectual Property Law & Entrepreneurship, 57 IDEA 183, 202-03
(2017) (“The mantra ‘making the world a better place,’ inexplicably
attached to every software development, no matter the level of
esotericism.”).
3 See, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, The Digital Poorhouse, Vol. LXV No. 11 THE
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 45 (June 7, 2018) (“Automated decisionJournal of Business & Technology Law
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Mobile technology, for example, does have its advantages but
it also enables employers to “demand that employees are
available at all hours of the day,” and “an increasing number
of individuals face the health risks associated with over work
and burn out.”4
Of course there have long been some skeptics; 5 over
three decades ago an astute observer noted: “No one objects
when a retail transaction takes three times longer than it did
ten years ago because now it’s enacted on a computerized
cash register.”6 These days, some people are being paid to
assist or act like robots, 7 and the occasional machine
malfunction may be the only thing preserving their jobs. 8
Technology may even be changing the way we think, and not
making has revolutionized many sectors of the economy and it brings real
gains to society. It also threatens privacy, autonomy, democratic practice,
and the ideals of social equality in ways we are only beginning to
appreciate.”); E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF
PEOPLE MATTERED 157 (1973) (“The amount of real leisure a society
enjoys tends to be in inverse proportion to the amount of labour-saving
machinery it employs.”) (internal quotations omitted).
4 Paul M. Secunda, The Employee Right to Disconnect, MARQUETTE L.
SCH. LEGAL STUD. PAPER NO. 18-02, 19 (Feb. 1, 2018), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3116158.
5 See, e.g., JIMMY BUFFETT, Everybody’s On The Phone, on TAKE THE
WEATHER WITH YOU (RCA Records, 2006) (“Everybody’s on the phone; So
connected and all alone; From the pizza boy to the socialite; We all salute
the satellites.”).
6 PAUL FUSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS
SYSTEM 176 (1983).
7 Cf. Olivia Solon, The Rise of ‘Pseudo-AI’: How Tech Firms Quietly Use
Humans to do Bots’ Work, THE GUARDIAN (July 6, 2018, 3:01 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/06/artificialintelligence-ai-humans-bots-tech-companies (“it’s cheaper and easier to
get humans to behave like robots than it is to get machines to behave like
humans”).
8 See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, Intellectual Property and the End of
Work (Aug. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011735.
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necessarily for the better.9 The effects on our minds of “a
world in which we’re constantly watched and always
distracted,” are not currently fully understood, but it would
be naïve to think that such effects are entirely positive or do
not exist.10 Technology itself is neither inherently good nor
evil; it is a neutral force and its effects depend on how it is
employed.11 Shawn Bayern puts it well: “The problem isn’t
technology; it’s what we’re doing with it.”12
This article will explore how technology could change
the way we think (or don’t think) about law, and whether
such changes would be beneficial. Part I will use the novel
Ready Player One to consider how virtual reality technology
might distract people from reality. Considering a
hypothetical patent on a virtual reality idea from the novel,
Part II will discuss the evolving law of patentable subject
matter and abstract ideas. Part III will consider predictions
that legal thought of the type done in the previous part will
become automated and then will consider some potential
drawbacks of replacing human legal thought with artificial
legal thought. This article will then briefly conclude by
See, e.g., Robert Darnton, The Greatest Show on Earth, LXV 11 THE NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 68, 72 (June 28, 2018) (“According to McIntyre,
the change that did the most to create the current post-truth environment
is the rise of social media.”) (reviewing LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH
(2018)).
10 FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF
BIG TECH 8 (2017); see generally NICHOLAS G. CARR, THE SHALLOWS:
WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2010).
11 See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY 33
(1977) (“The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous.”);
ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 295 (1956) (“The machine is bad only in the
way that it is now employed. Its benefits must be accepted even if its
ravages are rejected.”).
12 Shawn Bayern, Why I Don’t Blog, HUFFPOST (June 20, 2010, 5:12 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shawn-bayern/why-i-dont-blog-yes-irec_b_542127.html.
9
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questioning whether anyone will be thinking about the law
in the future, and whether it matters.
I.

VIRTUAL LAW

In his sci-fi novel Ready Player One,13 Ernest Cline imagines
the promises and perils of virtual reality technology. The
novel is set in a mid-twenty-first century future where the
physical world has deteriorated to the point that most people
live primarily in a virtual environment known as OASIS.14
The OASIS was created by an eccentric genius character,15
and one positive aspect of the OASIS virtual reality is that it
seems to have a beneficial and democratizing effect on the
education system.16 Books, movies, and music, all seem to be
easily and freely accessible, at least so long as the materials
are more than forty years old.17
One can imagine, though, that if a less benevolent
organization or figure were to gain control, the system could
ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE (2011).
See id. at 58-60 (“As the era of cheap, abundant energy drew to a close,
poverty and unrest began to spread like a virus. Every day, more and
more people had reason to seek solace inside Halliday and Morrow’s
virtual utopia.”).
15 See id. at 55-56 (“Despite his eccentricities, no one ever questioned
Halliday’s genius.”). The eccentric genius, James Halliday, “suffered
from Asperger’s syndrome, or from some other form of high-functioning
autism,” and created Gregarious Games, which later became Gregarious
Simulation Systems [GSS] along with his childhood friend, Ogden
Morrow. Id. at 54-56.
16 See id. at 47 (“All of my teachers were pretty great. Unlike their realworld counterparts, most of the OASIS public school teachers seemed to
genuinely enjoy their job, probably because they didn’t have to spend half
their time acting as babysitters and disciplinarians.”).
17 Id. at 62 (“The Almanac contained thousands of references to Halliday’s
favorite books, TV shows, movies, songs, graphic novels, and videogames.
Most of these items were over forty years old, and so free digital copies of
them could be downloaded from the OASIS.”).
13
14
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instead easily be used as a tool for mind control and
propaganda. Indeed in the novel, the genius creator has
recently passed away, and the protagonists are attempting to
prevent the OASIS from falling into the hands of a “fascist
multinational conglomerate.”18
While the OASIS provides an escape from the bleak
physical world, it may also contribute to the decay of that
world by providing a distraction. 19 The main protagonist
doesn’t bother voting for U.S. government officials, reasoning
that it “didn’t matter who was in charge,” because those
“people were rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic and
everyone knew it,” but he does vote in the OASIS User
Council elections.20 With this lack of attention, the laws of
the United States in the novel have apparently devolved to
the point where large corporations can force a citizen with
unpaid debts into “indenturement” via a “corporate arrest.”21
The virtual world of the OASIS is divided into different
sectors, and to some extent the “rules of the game” differ
Id. at 118. See also id. at 33 (“I was horrified at the thought of IOI
[Innovative Online Industries, the world’s largest Internet service
provider] taking control of the OASIS. . . . User anonymity and free speech
would become things of the past.”); id. at 28 (“Back when Halliday was
still running the company, GSS had won the right to keep every OASIS
user’s identity private in a landmark Supreme Court ruling.”).
19 ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE 120 (2011) (Ogden Morrow left the
company he co-founded, GSS, because he felt that OASIS had “become a
self-imposed prison for humanity,” that is, a “pleasant place for the world
to hide from its problems while human civilization slowly collapses,
primarily due to neglect.”).
20 See id. at 201 (“I did take the time to vote in the OASIS elections,
however, because their outcomes actually affected me. . . . I voted to
reelect . . . those two geezers [who] had been doing a kick-ass job of
protecting user rights for over a decade.”).
21 Id. at 270-73 (“These men were IOI [corporate] credit officers with a
valid indenturement arrest warrant.”).
18
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depending on which zone the user is in.22 These rules (or
virtual laws)23 are mostly hard-coded into the virtual reality;
certain areas, for example, are “no player-versus-player
combat” zones, where any attempt to harm another person
(or “player”) will simply be ineffectual. 24 This automatic
enforcement is an interesting aspect of “law” in virtual
reality, and obviously a major difference from most of our
current reality, where laws must be enforced through other
mechanisms. In such a future, virtual (or even real) patents
might automatically issue upon an invention in virtual
reality, and patent infringement in virtual reality could
perhaps automatically be disallowed.25
There is at least one minor reference to patent law in
Ready Player One. Before he died, James Halliday, the
eccentric genius creator of OASIS, programmed into the
virtual world an elaborate contest, the winner of which would
gain control of his company and effective control of the virtual
Id. at 49-50 (“Each zone had a unique combination of rules and
parameters. Magic would function in some zones and not in others. The
same was true of technology.”).
23 Cf. Gilad Yadin, Virtual Reality Exceptionalism, 20 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 839, 841 (2018) (“In Wonderland, the rules of the real world do
not apply; Alice moves between areas governed by anarchy, mock
etiquette, and absurdist absolute sovereignty.”) (citing Mary Liston, The
Rule of Law Through the Looking Glass, 21 LAW & LITERATURE 42, 46
(2009)).
24 CLINE, supra note 13, at 50 (“If you flew your technology-based starship
into a zone where technology didn’t function, your engines would fail the
moment you crossed the zone border. . . . There were pacifist zones where
no player-versus-player combat was allowed, and player-versus-player
zones where it was every avatar for themselves.”).
25 Cf. Richard M. Re, Imagining Perfect Surveillance, 64 UCLA L. REV.
DISC. 264 (2016); see also Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not
Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3135549 (“[A]n unappealable fine imposed by a red light
camera, and automatically deducted from a motorist’s bank account,
would amount to pure automation of law[.]”).
22
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OASIS. 26 One minor “level” in this contest involves the
contestant stepping into the role of a movie character, and
having to correctly say the lines and act in the role of that
character in order to move on. 27 Apparently no one had
thought of designing a game like this before, but it turned out
to be very popular, and upon realizing what Halliday had
done, his company “patented the idea,” and began creating
such interactive games for many different movies, calling the
games Flicksyncs.28
At first glance, the patenting of this entire class of
games seems to run afoul of the adage that “one may not
patent an idea,”29 that is, the patent eligibility prohibition on
“abstract ideas.”30 On the other hand, as explained below, to
the extent that new technology was required to implement
the idea, that technology would potentially be patent eligible.
The next part will consider the patentability of this fictional
class of games as a thought experiment for teasing out some
incoherence in the contemporary doctrine of patent eligible
subject matter.

CLINE, supra note 13, at 1–4.
See id. at 108–12.
28 Id. at 112 (“When GSS got wind of the WarGames simulation inside the
First Gate (and they did a short time later), the company quickly patented
the idea and began to buy up the rights to old movies and TV shows and
convert them into immersive interactive games that they dubbed
Flicksyncs.”).
29 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). See also In re Comiskey,
554 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has held that
‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.’”) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v.
Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874)).
30 See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 977 (“‘Abstract ideas’ are one type
of subject matter that the Supreme Court has consistently held fall
beyond the broad reaches of patentable subject matter under § 101.”).
26
27
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II.

PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
A. Abstraction and Innovation

The Patent Act defines patent eligible subject matter in §
101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.”31 This language is fairly broad and inclusive,
which is reasonable given that it defines only eligibility, not
patentability. 32 If something is not patent eligible, it of
course cannot be patentable. But if it is eligible, that doesn’t
necessarily make it patentable.33 In order to be patentable,
the invention must also meet the statute’s other
requirements, such as novelty (§ 102), nonobviousness (§
103), and enablement (§ 112).34
Some inventions or discoveries that are novel,
nonobvious, and enabled are nevertheless not patentable
because they claim subject matter that is not even eligible for
a patent under § 101. 35 In order to avoid conflating
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Cf. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1370 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(Moore, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc)
(“the single sentence in § 101 actually contains two patentability
requirements: eligibility and utility.”).
33 See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“a patent that presents a process sufficient to pass the
coarse eligibility filter may nonetheless be invalid as indefinite because
the invention would ‘not provide sufficient particularity and clarity to
inform skilled artisans of the bounds of the claim.’” (quoting Star Sci., Inc.
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).
34 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2012).
35 See, e.g., Maxus Strategic Sys. v. Aqumin LLC, No. A-11-CV-073-LY,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152032, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2015) (“If a claim
is not drawn to patent-eligible subject matter, it ‘must be rejected even if
31
32
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patentability with eligibility, it has been urged that courts
should consider eligibility after patentability,36 but perhaps
unfortunately, the recent law has not tended to go in this
direction.37 The recognized categories of non-eligible subject
matter are: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena; and
(3) abstract ideas.38
What I would like to suggest here is that the third
category of non-eligible subject matter, abstract ideas, is
different from the first two in that it does not invoke “nature”
or the “natural,” and that this is an important and underrecognized difference.39 Something that is natural, though it
might be discovered by humans, is almost by definition not
it meets all the other legal requirements of patentability.’” (quoting In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).
36 See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“Rather than taking the path the dissent urges, courts could
avoid the swamp of verbiage that is § 101 by exercising their inherent
power to control the processes of litigation, and insist that litigants
initially address patent invalidity issues in terms of the conditions of
patentability defenses as the statute provides, specifically §§ 102, 103,
and 112.”) (internal citation omitted); BASCOM Glob. Internet Services,
Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., concurring) (“There is no good reason why the district court
should be constrained from determining patentability, instead of
eligibility based on ‘abstract idea,’ when the patentability/validity
determination would be dispositive of the dispute.”).
37 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 21), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3161621
(“[A]
surprising amount of case law states that courts must decide patent
eligibility before analyzing other issues [.]”).
38 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014)
(“We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.” (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013))).
39 See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., No. 2016-2502, 896 F.3d 1335,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Plager, J., concurring and dissenting).
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created or invented by humans40 (at least not in the colloquial
sense of the word “invention”).41 By contrast, abstract ideas
are at least arguably products of human thought or
imagination, so an abstract idea can potentially be
inventive.42 But due to the Court’s view of § 101, even a truly
inventive pure abstract idea is not patent eligible subject
matter.43
Natural, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
natural (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); Artificial, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/artificial (last visited Sept. 24,
2018); cf. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132
(1948) (“[I]t certainly was not the product of invention. There is no way
in which we could call it such unless we borrowed invention from the
discovery of the natural principle itself.”).
41 But cf. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (“The term ‘invention’ means invention or
discovery.”); PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT
JUDICIAL GUIDE 14-31 (3d. ed. 2016) (“The fact that § 101 of the Patent
Act confers patent eligibility on ‘[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof . . .’ however, only adds to the
confusion.”).
42 See, e.g., Derek Abbott, The Reasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics,
101 Proc. IEEE No. 10, 2147, 2153 (2013) (“Mathematics is a human
invention for describing patterns and regularities.”). But see CLS Bank
Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie,
J., concurring) (“[A] person cannot truly ‘invent’ an abstract idea or
scientific truth. He or she can discover it, but not invent it.”). This article
agrees with Judge Lourie that one cannot “invent” a scientific truth, but
takes the position (contrary to his) that one can at least arguably invent
an abstract idea. See discussion supra Part II.A; see also Frederick
Schauer, Law as a Malleable Artifact, Oxford Univ. Press (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3183928 (“[T]he very ideas (or concepts, if you will) of chairs,
of art, and of music are human creations, and are consequently unlike
gold, water, and elephants . . . .”).
43 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct.
2107, 2117 (2013) (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Lourie, J., concurring in the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“[M]any brilliant and
40
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This is all to say while “nature” and “natural” at least
pull in the other direction from “inventive,” the same is not
true of “abstract.” The opposite of abstract is concrete, 44
whereas the opposite of natural is artificial, i.e., made by
humans. 45 A thing cannot be both natural and invented
(though it could be discovered), but an idea can be both
abstract and invented by humans; 46 abstractness and
inventiveness are separate and essentially unrelated
concepts.47
A pure algorithm for example, even if inventive or
“newly discovered,” is an abstract idea ineligible for patent
protection.48 The idea for blockchain technology described in
unconventional ideas must be beyond patenting simply because they are
‘only’ ideas, which cannot be monopolized.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new
abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”).
44 Abstract, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
abstract (defining “abstract” as “thought of apart from concrete realities,
specific objects, or actual instances”) (last visited September 24, 2018).
45 See Artificial and Natural, supra note 40.
46 Whether machines could invent an idea is an interesting question. See
generally Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and Patent Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (forthcoming 2018),
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036030.
47 Cf. Affinity Labs of Tex. v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (the patentee asserted that its idea was “novel as of the priority
of the patent,” but the court found that even “assuming that is true, it
does not avoid the problem of abstractness”); Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns., LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Eligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.”).
48 See, e.g., Market Track, LLC v. Efficient Collaborative Retail Mktg.,
LLC, No. 14-C-4957, 2015 WL 3637740, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2015)
(“[M]erely implementing the arithmetic steps in a newly discovered
mathematical algorithm . . . did not add enough . . . to transform that
algorithm—an abstract idea—into patentable subject matter[.]”) (citing
Gottschalk v. Benson 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
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the Bitcoin whitepaper was a brilliantly inventive idea, 49
though it may have been too abstract to be patentable. Such
a patent would preempt downstream innovation and “might
tend to impede innovation” 50 in the blockchain space,
although more specific implementations of the technology
could be patentable.51
Some mathematical equations may describe laws of
nature, but all pure equations are also ineligible as abstract
ideas,52 though a specific application of an equation could be
patent eligible. 53 Einstein’s E=mc2, for example, is an
See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER
ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2009), available at https://bitcoin.org/
bitcoin.pdf.
50 See Mayo Collaborative Servs v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
71 (2012) (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent
might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”);
see also id. at 85 (“In Bilski the Court pointed out that to allow ‘petitioners
to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields.’”)
(quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010)).
51 See Gurneet Singh, Are Internet-Implemented Applications of
Blockchain Technology Patent-Eligible in the United States, 17 CHI. KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 356, 376 (2018) (“federal U.S. law allows a patent to be
granted for many, but not all, aspects of internet-implemented
applications of blockchain technology.”); see also Ira Schaefer and Ted
Mylnar, Is a Blockchain Patent Still Possible? COINDESK (Nov. 15, 2016,
10:05 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-patent-still-possible/
(“[I]mprovements in blockchain data structures, in solving proof of work
problems, and in encryption and hashing functions have the potential to
be patent-eligible subject matter.”).
52 See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Mathematical formulas are a type of abstract idea.”);
Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“A mathematical formula may describe a law of nature,
a scientific truth, or an abstract idea.”); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
250 F. 3d 705, 711 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (“Mathematical calculations and
formulas are abstract ideas.”).
53 See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(“This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to
49
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abstract equation which at least in theory describes a law of
nature. 54 Einstein did not invent the law of nature, he
discovered it (to the extent that the theory is correct), but he
did arguably invent the abstract idea of the equation, as he
developed an abstract theory of physics and worked out the
mathematical description.55
This was a major accomplishment, and a major
breakthrough for science, but such pure abstract ideas are
nevertheless not patent eligible subject matter. One reason
is that mathematical equations are elemental building blocks
of scientific and technological work.56 Another reason is that
abstract ideas are essentially thoughts, and patents should
not be capable of monopolizing thoughts. 57 Constraining
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”); Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d
at 1058-59 (holding patentable a method for analyzing electrocardiograph
signals that used “electronic equipment programmed to perform
mathematical computation.”).
54 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 78 (“Einstein, we assume,
could not have patented his famous law by claiming a process consisting
of simply telling linear accelerator operators to refer to the law to
determine how much energy an amount of mass has produced (or vice
versa).”).
55 See generally DAVID BODANIS, E=MC2: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE WORLD’S
MOST FAMOUS EQUATION (Bloomsbury Publishing 2009).
56 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 71 (‘“Phenomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”’ (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972))); id. at 89 (“[T]he cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition
against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like,
which serves as a somewhat more easily administered proxy for the
underlying ‘building-block’ concern”); PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT
CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 14-31 (3d ed. 2016) (“[L]aws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are basic building blocks
of human ingenuity.”).
57 See Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc)
(“No one should be inhibited from thinking by a patent. . . . Moreover
such a patent would be unenforceable. Who knows what people are
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13

Virtual Ideas

thought would seem to be counterproductive to the patent
system’s goal of promoting innovation, whereas a society
where free thought is encouraged would likely tend to be
more innovative. 58 Indeed, patentable innovation requires
thought that would not have been obvious to others.59
So even inventive abstract ideas are not patent
eligible. But to avoid confusion, it is important to recognize
that abstractness and innovativeness are separate concepts;
that abstract ideas can be inventive, even if they are
nevertheless not patent eligible. The doctrine has often failed
to articulate this idea; indeed in Alice itself the Court states:
“[W]e must examine the elements of the claim to determine
whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible
application.”60 Taking this cue from Alice, courts often look
for “additional claim elements that introduce an inventive
concept to the claim.”61 Such language seems to ignore the
possibility that the abstract idea itself could have been an
inventive concept. What the courts should be looking for is
not just any inventive concept, but a non-abstract inventive
thinking?”) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson
(Aug. 13, 1813) (“[I]f nature has made any one thing less susceptible, than
all others, of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power
called an Idea.”)).
58 Cf. Bertrand Russell, The Role of Individuality, in AUTHORITY AND THE
INDIVIDUAL 37 (1949) (“[A] community needs, if it is to prosper, a certain
number of individuals who do not wholly conform to the general type.
Practically all progress, artistic, moral, and intellectual, as depended
upon such individuals . . . .”).
59 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
60 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66 at 72-73 (2012)).
61 Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Polar Electro Oy, 243 F. Supp. 3d 1229,
1235-36 (D. Utah 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355).
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concept. 62 But courts sometimes find that claims are
ineligible because “the patent does not reveal anything more
than a non-inventive abstract idea,” 63 which confusingly
seems to imply that the claims would be patent eligible if the
abstract idea were inventive. With courts often failing to
recognize that abstractness is a separate concept from
inventiveness,64 the doctrine has become rather muddled and
confused.65 That such imprecise use of language has led to
confusion should be no surprise.66

See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“No matter how much of an advance in the finance field the
claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with
no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm. An
advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting.”).
63 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. QuantifiCare, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1025
(N.D. Cal. 2017).
64 Cf. Jedi Techs., Inc. v. Spark Networks, Inc., No. 1:16-1055-GMS, 2017
WL 3315279, at *8 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2017) (“although the ’977 patent
recites an abstract idea, it should not be found invalid if there is evidence
of an inventive concept or contribution”).
65 See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc)
(“I believe the law needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by
Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field
consider are § 101 problems”); cf. Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming
Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 647 (“The consensus view is that
the Court’s eligibility jurisprudence is impenetrable.”); Ryan Davis, Iancu
Decries ‘Tortured Exercise’ of Patent Eligibility Analysis, LAW360 (June
12, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1052844/iancudecries-tortured-exercise-of-patent-eligibility-analysis; Robert Stoll,
Alice Angst Intensifies, LAW360 (March 23, 2018, 1:01 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1025590/alice-angst-intensifies.
66 See Paul M. Janicke, A Need for Clearer Language about Patent Law,
11 JOHN MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 457 (2012).
62
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B. The Non-Abstract Inventive Concept
Proceeding now down the rabbit hole of Alice’s wondrous twopart test, the first step is to determine whether the claims
are “directed to” one of the three categories of patent
ineligible subject matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas. 67 If not, the claims are patent eligible,
(that is, they clear the § 101 hurdle, though they may not be
patentable). 68 But if so, the next step is to look for an
“inventive concept” that transforms the claims into
“something more” than the patent ineligible subject matter.69
Although a number of judges have, for good reason,
questioned the value of the two-step test, 70 the Federal
Circuit has reaffirmed that both steps are substantial.71 For
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1297 (2012)).
68 See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Bascom Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., concurring) (“Claims that are imprecise or that
read on prior art or that are unsupported by description or that are not
enabled raise questions of patentability, not eligibility.”).
69 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (2014)
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
72 (2012)).
70 See, e.g., Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352-53 (Newman, J., concurring) (“I
write separately to urge a more flexible approach to the determination of
patent eligibility, for the two-step protocol for ascertaining whether a
patent is for an ‘abstract idea’ is not always necessary to resolve patent
disputes.”); Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 15-cv-8814(KBF), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101796, at *40 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016) (“A number
of courts have aptly observed that it is easier to separate the two steps in
recitation than in application and that the two steps could arguable be
collapsed into a single one.”).
71 See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(explaining that the Supreme Court’s two-stage inquiry “plainly
contemplates that the first step of the inquiry is a meaningful one, i.e.,
67
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example in Enfish, the court found that the claims were not
directed to an abstract idea, because the “plain focus of the
claims [was] on an improvement to computer functionality
itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is
used in its ordinary capacity.”72 As such, the court did not
proceed to the more complicated inquiry of step two. 73 Step
one may thus function as an initial filter or first look at the
claims; if the general focus of the claims is not on ineligible
subject matter, then it is not necessary to engage the more
difficult inquiry of whether the additional matter contains an
inventive concept.
Step two is where the difference between abstract
ideas and the first two categories becomes relevant. Because
nature (or the natural) cannot be invented by humans,74 an
inventive concept must necessarily be something other than
the law of nature or natural phenomena. By contrast, an
abstract idea could be an inventive concept, though it is not
the type of inventive concept that one should be looking for
at step two of the Alice test. So the “inventive concept” part
of the test makes more sense in the context of natural
phenomena or laws of nature; indeed the two-step test was
“initially set forth in Mayo in the context of natural laws,”
but then was extended to abstract ideas in Alice. 75
Traditionally, the evaluation of inventiveness was more
appropriate under §§ 102 and 103, but the Court in Alice /
Mayo has moved the inventiveness inquiry more into § 101.76
that a substantial class of claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible
concept”).
72 Id. at 1336 (explaining that the claims “are directed to a specific
improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the selfreferential table”).
73 Id. at 1339.
74 See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.
75 Iron Gate, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101796, at *16–17 n.4.
76 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
90 (2012) (“We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional
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The need for a non-abstract inventive concept stems
from the notion that one cannot transform an abstract idea
into patentable subject matter simply by adding
“insignificant post-solution activity,” 77 or by applying the
abstract idea using routine and conventional technology such
as a general purpose computer. 78 This is true even if the
steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty
inquiry might sometimes overlap.”); Andrew Schreiber, Go (En)Fish:
Drawing CAD Files from the Patent Eligibility Pool, 58 IDEA 1, 54 (2017)
(“[T]he Alice step two inventive concept analysis imports § 102 and § 103
considerations.”); PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT
JUDICIAL GUIDE 14-31 (3d ed. 2016) (“As the evolution of these doctrines
reveals, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on inventive application rests on
a questionable jurisprudential foundation.”) (citing Jeffrey A. Lefstin,
Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015)); see also
Paxton M. Lewis, Comment, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and
Obviousness: Alice’s Substitution of Section 103, 2017 UTAH L. REV.
ONLAW 13 (2017).
77 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014)
(“We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of
intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010)
(explaining that the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot
be circumvented by [merely] . . . adding [superfluous] postsolution
activity.”’) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-192 (1981));
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299 (“‘[P]ost-solution activity’ that is purely
‘conventional or obvious,’ the Court wrote, ‘can[not] transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.’”) (quoting Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)); see also Laurence Rogers, Mayo Overlap
Between Sections 101 And 102/103 — Not New, LAW360: EXPERT
ANALYSIS (July 20, 2012, 1:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/356042/mayo-overlap-between-sections-101-and-102-103-notnew.
78 See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An inventive concept that transforms the
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention must be significantly more
than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to
implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.”) (citing Alice, 134
S.Ct. at 2358).
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abstract idea itself is innovative. 79 If the doctrine is to
maintain some semblance of coherence, what the courts
should be searching for at step two is an inventive concept
aside from the abstract idea; a non-abstract inventive
concept.80
Courts often do not articulate this clearly, instead
describing step two as simply a search for an inventive
concept.81 There is no claim here that abstract ideas are any
less deserving of exemption under § 101 than the two
categories of nature, the point here is simply that abstract
ideas can fairly be thought of as “invented” by humans,
whereas nature generally cannot, and that courts should be
more cognizant of this difference. Particularly so, when
importing language from a test developed in the context of
natural phenomena into the context of abstract ideas, if
confusion is to be avoided.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82 (explaining that in Flook, “putting the formula
to the side, there was no ‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application of
the formula.”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)); Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining
that “the second step of the Alice inquiry” asks if “there is some inventive
concept in the application of the abstract idea.”) (emphasis added).
81 See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In short, the claimed solution amounts to an inventive
concept for resolving this particular Internet-centric problem, rendering
the claims patent-eligible.”); IPLearn-Focus, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No.
14-cv-00151-JD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90077, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 10,
2015) (“The second step of this test has been described as a search for an
inventive concept.”) (internal quotes omitted) (citations omitted); Aatrix
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1124 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (stating that the district court below found that the claims were
“directed to abstract ideas without inventive concepts.”); Pres. Wellness
Techs. LLC v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, No. 2:15-CV-1559-WCB,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61841, at *20 (E.D. Tex. May 9, 2016) (“Following
the analytical framework set forth in Alice, the Court addresses the
questions whether the ’271 claims are drawn to an abstract idea and, if
so, whether they embody an inventive concept.”).
79
80
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C. Improvement or Application
Back to virtual reality: what if one were to think of a new,
non-obvious abstract idea, and simply say, “Do it in virtual
reality.” Would that idea be patent eligible? We know that
simply applying an abstract idea on a routine and
conventional general-purpose computer is not sufficient to
make the claims patent eligible, 82 but is virtual reality
technology routine and conventional? In the future of Ready
Player One, where many people spend the majority of their
time in virtual reality,83 the answer would seem to be a clear
yes. As such, the novel’s hypothetical patent on Flicksyncs
would seem to be of questionable validity. The idea of a video
game where the player receives points for correctly acting the
part of a character in a movie is an abstract one, even
assuming that it is novel and non-obvious as was alleged in
the book.84 It is perhaps an inventive concept, but that does
not make the idea any less abstract.
Applying this abstract idea using routine and
conventional virtual reality technology would not be
sufficient to make it patent eligible. But if some improvement
to the virtual reality technology itself were required to
implement the idea, this would likely make it patentable, as
it could be a sufficient non-abstract “inventive concept,” to
pass Alice step two.85 Whether the application technology is
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE 58–60 (2011).
84 See id. at 112.
85 See Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 15-cv-8814(KBF), 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 101796, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016) (finding the claims
patent eligible because they were “directed to particular improvements
over prior art multimedia data indexing techniques that render such data
accessible in real time.”); see also Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding the
patent claims at issue patent eligible because they were “not claiming the
82
83
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routine and conventional is a question of fact,86 and the novel
Ready Player One is not entirely clear on whether some
improvement to the technology was required to make
Flicksyncs possible.
It is important to note that the technology probably
need not be entirely novel or non-obvious in order to avoid
being routine and conventional. 87 In other words, the
eligibility hurdle of not routine and conventional seems to be
potentially lower than the patentability hurdle of novelty and
nonobviousness.88
Consider a claim to an inventive abstract idea, where
the non-abstract portion of the claim is more than routine
and conventional, but less than new and non-obvious. In
other words, the non-abstract portion of the claim could be a
sufficient “inventive concept” to pass § 101, but in order to
pass §§ 102 and 103, it would need the help of the abstract
(but more inventive) portion of the claim. Such a claim would
raise the question of whether ineligible subject matter should
be filtered out of the §§ 102 and 103 analysis, that is, treated
as prior art for purposes of that analysis even if new and nonobvious, as has been persuasively argued. 89 However, the
idea of filtering content simply applied to the Internet,” but were “instead
claiming a technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet
that overcomes existing problems . . . .”).
86 See Gugliuzza, supra note 37, manuscript 7 n.38; see also Aatrix
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1130 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
87 See Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., 725 Fed. Appx. 959, 965 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“Something is not well-understood, routine, and conventional
merely because it is disclosed in a prior art reference.”).
88 But see PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL
GUIDE 14-30 – 14-31 (3d. ed. 2016) (“[T]he inventiveness required for §
101 eligibility is distinct from and arguably more demanding than § 103
nonobviousness analysis.”) (emphasis added).
89 See Nicholas J. Szabo, Comment, Elemental Subject Matter, 7
(unpublished Comment), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=936326 (“For § 101 subject matter analysis to be
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prevailing approach instead seems to be to try to filter the
ineligible matter out of the (comparatively) shorthand
inventiveness inquiry at the § 101 stage, but not to do so in
the full-blown § 103 obviousness analysis.90 As such, it seems
that the inventiveness of an abstract idea can help to
establish § 103 nonobviousness, even though it cannot help
establish § 101 eligibility.
Although at some point virtual reality technology will
likely become routine and conventional,91 the cases seem to
suggest that we are not there yet. Practically, framing the
application of an abstract idea in virtual reality as a specific
improvement to the virtual reality apparatus itself, if
possible, can increase the likelihood of a finding of patent
eligibility. 92 For example, in Thales, the Federal Circuit
coherent, it must serve not as a bar but as a filter, a preliminary step that
alters element by element how the claims will be analyzed by § 102 and
§ 103.”). See also Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (en banc) (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for
rehearing en banc) (noting that the “Supreme Court has characterized
the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry as a threshold test that precedes the
requirements described in §§ 102, 103, and 112.”).
90 MENELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 14-31 (“According to Mayo, the
inventive application requirement treats the patentees’ discovery of the
law of nature, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, or algorithms (in
Flook) as known (even where it was not), whereas § 103 nonobviousness
focuses on ‘the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art.’”); see also Rogers, supra note 77 (explaining that the § 101 analysis
“need not be the same thing as conducting an in-depth novelty or
obviousness analysis in which the claimed invention is rigorously
compared to the prior art.”).
91 See LEXINNOVA, VIRTUAL REALITY: PATENT LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS 4
(2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/plrdocs/en/lexinnova_plr_virtual_reali
ty.pdf (“Virtual Reality is expected to be a far-reaching technology in the
next 10 years.”).
92 See Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (explaining that courts evaluating eligibility must “ask
whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer
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found that the claims at issue were “not directed to an
abstract idea” because they “specif[ied] a particular
configuration of inertial sensors and a particular method of
using the raw data from the sensors in order to more
accurately calculate the position and orientation of an object
on a moving platform.”93
Following Thales, the district court in Electronic
Scripting Products found the claims patent eligible because
they were “not merely directed to the abstract idea of
observing known points in space and determining their
position and orientation,” but rather, were directed to the use
of “photodetectors and relative motion sensors mounted on
manipulated objects to provide a low-cost method to
determine absolute pose in close-range and confined threedimensional environments, ideal for virtual reality
applications.”94 Thus, it seems that by claiming for example
a particular configuration or use of physical sensors to
implement an abstract idea in virtual reality, a patentee can
avoid pre-empting too much future innovation and increase
the chances that the claims will be upheld as patent
eligible.95

functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea”) (quoting Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
93 Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2017); see also Chargepoint, Inc. v. Semaconnect, Inc., No. MJG-17-3717
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49026, *29 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018) (stating that in
Thales, “the Federal Circuit held that the claims were directed to an
improvement in technology instead of an abstract idea”).
94 Elec. Scripting Prods. v. HTC Am. Inc., No. 17-cv-05806-RS 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43687, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018).
95 See id. at *13 (“Nor do the asserted Patents disproportionately preempt
the use of all virtual reality products.”).
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III.

ARTIFICIAL THOUGHTS

As the preceding discussion has shown by way of example,
the law is not always a model of clarity and coherence. But
it is worth considering whether such occasional inefficiencies
may just be part of the price we pay for governing ourselves.96
Allegedly the “rise of Big Data could fundamentally change
the design and structure of legal norms and thus the legal
system itself.” 97 Indeed, with the rise of self-driving
vehicles, 98 Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett have
predicted “that laws, too, will be self-driving.”99 In the same
vein, these same authors predict that advances in artificial
intelligence and communications technology will “be able to
identify the rules applicable to an actual situation and inform
the regulated actor exactly how to comply” and that such
“microdirectives will become the dominant form of law[.]”100
Accordingly they predict that “opportunities for statutory
interpretation and filling the gaps in vague standards will
dry up as citizens are simply instructed to obey simple
directives.”101
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[T]o
institute a new Government, laying its foundations on such principles as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness[.]”).
97 Christoph Busch & Alberto De Franceschi, Granular Legal Norms: Big
Data and the Personalization of Private Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
DATA SCIENCE AND LAW (forthcoming 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3181914.
98 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in
Arizona, Where Robots Roam, THE N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018).
99 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U.
TORONTO L. J. 429, 442 (2016).
100 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and
Standards, 92 IND. L. J. 1401, 1404 (2017).
101 Id. at 1435 (emphasis added). Casey and Niblett note that one might
alternatively frame this trend towards “a simple microdirective for how
to comply with the law,” as “the death of standards.” Id. at 1405. It is
worth observing that the recent trend at least in patent law seems to have
96
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Casey and Niblett explicitly decline to take a
normative position on whether this alleged trend, which they
say implies a reduced role for judges, is beneficial for
society,102 though they do seem to contend that it will happen
regardless.103 This sort of tech-determinism is not uncommon
in the realm of technology generally, 104 but it seems
particularly inappropriate as applied to law.105 The fact that
been in precisely the opposite direction. See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Supreme
Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (2016) (“[T]he
Court has consistently adopted holistic standards to replace the brightline, formalistic rules that are characteristic of Federal Circuit patent
doctrine”).
102 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1405 (“Our analysis is positive
rather than normative. One might think of perfect calibration of laws to
legislative goals as problematic in a system with multiple branches and
checks and balances. Indeed, our analysis implies a reduced role for
judges and perhaps the need for institutional reforms to preserve
important aspects of our current system.”). It is interesting that the
authors explicitly decline to make a normative case for the sweeping
changes they seem to herald.
103 See id. at 1445 (“One might think that if the institutional upheaval
and autonomy concerns are great enough, lawmakers will reject the move
to microdirectives. We do not see this happening. The growth of
predictive technology is robust.”); id. at 1402 (“This new form – we call it
the microdirective – is the future of law.”); Casey & Niblett, supra note
99, at 438 (“The trend towards micro-directives will be real as the cost of
prediction and communication falls. The consequences relating to
morality, privacy, and autonomy should be addressed before microdirectives arrive.”).
104 See, e.g., ROB RIEMEN, TO FIGHT AGAINST THIS AGE 129 (2018) (“[H]e
added threateningly that ‘we simply have to adjust to the fact that this is
the future, these are the coming technological developments, you can’t
stop them, no one can.’”).
105 Cf. John Gardner, The Twilight of Legality 16 (University of Oxford,
Working Paper No. 4/2018) available at https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3109517 (“Tech-determinism is today the
favoured way of making those who still believe in the rule of law look like
they are going to be on the wrong side of history. Uber, for example, has
notoriously favoured that line: the rule of law is so yesterday; Uber is the
unstoppable future.”).
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we may have acquired the technology to change the law in a
certain way does not by itself provide adequate justification
for doing so; the normative case must be made.106
What could possibly go wrong? One concern recognized
in this literature is that personalized automated law
“abandons the equal application of general standards to all
individuals,” and perhaps one of the advantages of more
general laws is that they “deliberately ignore personal details
and thus grant a ‘protective space’ of individual freedom
where the law does not enter.”107 Similarly, autonomy “may
be increasingly constrained as more and more ethical
decisions are shifted from the purview of flawed humans to
consistent machines,” 108 and “[citizens who simply] follow
rules and directives may become robotic, mere automatons
who fail to appreciate the moral choices that should underlie
their actions.”109
This concern also seems to suggest some tension
between, on the one hand, the push towards micro-managing
people through legal micro-directives, and on the other hand,
the notion that the liberal democratic state should be a
limited state.110 If the laws governing daily life in a society
See supra note 102. Despite explicitly disclaiming the normative,
Casey and Niblett do contend that the “micro-directive” “[capture] the
benefits of both rules and standards without incurring the costs.”). Casey
& Niblett, supra note 100, at 1402. See also id. at 1402 n.1 (citing Louis
Kapalow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J.
557, 561 n.6 (1992)). There is at least one persuasive alternative account
of the rules and standards dialectic that Casey and Niblett do not
address. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV., 379
(1985) (discussing an alternative account of the rules and standards
dialectic that Casey and Niblett do not address).
107 Busch & De Franceschi, supra note 97, at *15–16.
108 Casey & Niblett, supra note 99, at 438.
109 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1444.
110 Pierre Schlag, Hohfeldian Analysis, Liberalism and Adjudication
(Some Tensions), THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR
WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARY,
106
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become so complex that ordinary citizens would need an
artificially intelligent robot directing them as to how to be in
compliance, 111 perhaps the better solution might be to
simplify the laws—to make them more understandable and
bring them more into accord with intuition. 112 As for
constitutional objections, Casey and Niblett proclaim that
“courts could, of course, bless the use of particular types of
algorithms going forward, deeming those to be
constitutionally proper,” and that such “delegation would
facilitate the promulgation of micro-directives in the
constitutional law space.”113
There is at least one additional concern that does not
seem to be fully recognized in this literature: the effect that
legal automation could have upon legal thought. Artificial
intelligence can tend to reduce thought when we let machines
do our thinking for us.114 For example, when one uses GPS
automatic driving navigation systems, part of the mind shuts
off and one does not tend to learn their way around the roads
(Balganesh, Sichelman, Smith eds. 2018) (manuscript at 22) (forthcoming
2018) (“From a Hohfeldian perspective, the assertion that a privilege is a
law-free zone is an analytical error. But from the strictly political
perspective of liberalism, it is not an error at all. On the contrary, the
spatialization strategy is wrought up with the fundamental political
liberal project of protecting the freedom of the sovereign individual legal
subject.”).
111 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1401 (“When an individual citizen
faces a legal choice, the machine will select from the catalog and
communicate to that individual the precise context-specific command (the
microdirective) necessary for compliance.”).
112 See
R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial
Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2006) (“[I]ntuition is
invariably central—whether overtly so or not—to the process of arriving
at a judicial outcome by any standard recognized means.”).
113 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1436.
114 See, e.g., Jeremy Bernstein, Out of My Mind: “A.I.”, 49 AM. SCHOLAR,
295, 299 (1980); Cf. FOER, supra note 10, at 72 (“The problem is that when
we outsource thinking to machines, we are really outsourcing thinking to
the organizations that run the machines.”).
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as well.115 Now this may not be a huge problem by itself, but
it does potentially raise a red flag about automating other
things, such as the law. Despite the modern (arguably
detrimental) reverence for positive thinking,116 it seems that
relatively little attention is paid to the value of thought itself.
It was observed some time ago that one of the
drawbacks of computerized law is that it would render law
uninteresting.117 This is not meant in the sense that the law
would become boring, but rather that people would no longer
have much of an incentive to be interested in it. Judges and
lawyers have a strong incentive to think about the law118 and
currently spend lots of time and energy doing just that,119 as
the analysis of patentable subject matter above shows by way
of example. But judges and lawyers are predicted to have a
reduced role in the future of automated law,120 and of course,
See, e.g., Joseph Stromberg, Is GPS ruining our ability to navigate for
ourselves?, VOX (Sept. 2, 2015, 11:31 AM), available at https://
www.vox.com/2015/9/2/9242049/gps-maps-navigation (“we have good
reason to believe that when we blindly follow GPS for direction, we’re not
exercising crucial navigational skills – and many of the scientists who
study how the human brain navigates are concerned”).
116 See BARBARA EHRENREICH, BRIGHT-SIDED: HOW POSITIVE THINKING IS
UNDERMINING AMERICA (2009). See also Albert J. Matricciani, Law & The
Culture of Civility, 36 MD. B. J. 12, 14 (2003) (discussing the value of
thought and the loss of personal space that has come with 21st century
technology.).
117 See Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 GA.
L. REV. 1277, 1299 (1977) (“A second cost will be to render areas of the
law uninteresting.”).
118 Cf. Pasquale, supra note 25, at manuscript 56 (explaining that
articulable legal standards “help us formulate convincing explanations
and justifications of legal decisionmaking, without foreordaining
outcomes in advance.”).
119 See D’Amato, supra note 117, at 1299 (“At present, many people are
immediately interested, whether financially or from a teaching or
research point of view, in conflicts of laws.”).
120 Id. at 1301.
115
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if there are fewer judges and lawyers, then there would also
be fewer law students, and fewer law professors.
In such a future, who would pay attention to whether
the law is fair or makes sense? Our current system, where
the law is shaped through a collaborative process involving
judges, lawyers, and to some extent clients, may not always
provide the clearest law most efficiently, but it does have the
advantage of ensuring that a class of people are paying close
attention to the law, and thus provides a certain degree of
accountability. 121 The legal thought and effort of many
people could be called redundant, (as compared with law in
the hands of a machine), but redundancy is not always a bad
thing.122 The human collaborative process through which the
law is applied (and to some extent made) is an important
aspect of the rule of law.123
Law in a sense is something that we as a society “do,”
so if we let machines do it for us, we might lose something
important, even if the machines do it well.124 An excellent
argument can move a judge and incrementally change the
law. This circumstance might be rare but the possibility
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35
(1921) (“[T]he judgment of the lawyer class, will spread to others, and
tinge the common consciousness and the common faith.”).
122 See generally John Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94
TEX. L. REV. 629 (2016).
123 Richard H. Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1997) (“[T]heories approaching the
Legal Process ideal type tend to conceive the subjects of legal justice as
reasonable persons, open to argument and persuasion, and deserving of
reasoned explanations that the law should aspire to provide.”); Pasquale,
supra note 25, at manuscript 49 (explaining that where legal technology
“reduces a legal relationship to a clear prescription . . . it is unlikely to
meet the complex standards of review and appeal embodied in the Legal
Process conception of the rule of law.”).
124 See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 140 (1998) (“To
put it plainly: To be really good at ‘doing law,’ one has to have serious
blind spots and a stunningly selective sense of curiosity.”).
121
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encourages citizens to think about and question our laws,
instead of blindly submitting to them. 125 The process by
which society can influence the law (through lawyers and
judges as intermediaries) may give us some sense that the
law is our collective creation instead of an opaque governing
authority.126
When law is instantaneously determined and
communicated such that actors need only “obey,” 127 the
period of suspended conclusion, during which thought takes
place,128 is lost. Can we trust machines to make and explain
the value judgments inherent in legal analysis?129 Are we
Cf. Matthew Redna, Kennedy Defends Rule of Law, Europe in Ninth
Circuit Speech, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 26, 2018), https://
www.courthousenews.com/kennedy-defends-rule-of-law-europe-in-ninthcircuit-speech/ (quoting Justice Kennedy as saying, “For us [the law is] a
promise. It’s a promise of liberty, of freedom, it means the right to plan
our own destiny.”).
126 See Pasquale, supra note 25, at manuscript 6 (“In order for legal
automation to truly respect rule of law principles, the adage ‘a rule of law,
not of men’ thus must be complemented by a new commitment – to a ‘rule
of persons, not machines.’”).
127 Compare Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1402 (“The citizen does
not have to weigh the reasonableness of her actions, nor does she have to
search for the content of a law. She just obeys a simple directive.”); with
Learned Hand, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 33 N.Y. ST. B. J. 415, 415 (1944)
(“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court
can even do much to help it.”).
128 See JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 12 (1933) (explaining that reflective
thinking “involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental
difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching,
hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and
dispose of the perplexity.”); see also Donald J. Kochan, Thinking Like
Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an ‘Attitude of Suspended
Conclusion’ Lost on Lawyers?, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 n.5 (2011).
129 See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in
Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 68 (2016) (“Inherent in the very idea of
judging is the notion of judgment; courts are frequently delegated
regulatory and adjudicative tasks that must choose between valid and
125
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comfortable with the idea of a future where, instead of
providing a legal opinion supported by reasons and developed
after considering arguments advanced through an
adversarial process, a “black box” machine simply spits out a
legal directive, 130 and the obedient citizen complies? This
system would amount to a pure assertion of authority, as
opposed to the giving of reasons in a judicial opinion after an
opportunity to be heard, which at least serves as an
explanation. 131 But when the only legal rule that people
know or understand is to follow the “micro-directive”—“obey
the machine”—then so much for transparency, candor, and
perhaps even rule of law.132
important social values.”); Joshua P. Davis, Law Without Mind: AI,
Ethics, and Jurisprudence 1 (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 201805, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3187513
(arguing that the “ultimate bulwark against ceding legal interpretation
to computers – from having computers usurp the responsibility and
authority of attorneys, citizens, and even judges – may be to recognize the
role of moral judgment in saying what the law is.”).
130 Davis, supra note 129, at 12 (“AI is often not transparent.”). For the
sake of transparency, were we to allow some AI to make its way into our
law, it is important that the underlying code at least be made public and
not be kept as a trade secret. Cf. David S. Levine, Secrecy and
Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 135 (2007) (arguing that trade secrets should to transparency and
accountability in public infrastructure).
131 Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636–37
(1995) (“The act of giving a reason is the antithesis of authority. When
the voice of authority fails, the voice of reason emerges. Or vice versa.”)
(emphasis added).
132 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 213 (1979) (“It is one of the important principles of the [rule of
law] doctrine that the making of particular laws should be guided by open
and relatively stable general rules.”); cf. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 195
(Harv. Univ. Press 2011) (“the exercise of legal authority . . . is an activity
of social planning”); Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L.
REV. 987, 990–91 (2008) (“[J]udges must make public the legal grounds
for their decisions. Those who fail to give sincere legal justifications
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CONCLUSION
In Ready Player One, the eccentric genius creator of the
OASIS was interested in 1980s culture and created a contest
for control of his company in part to give the world an
incentive to share his obsession, a strategy which worked to
considerable effect. 133 Judges, lawyers, law students, and
law professors, are to some degree obsessed with the law (or
at least quite interested in it), because they have an incentive
to be, as the above discussion of abstract ideas and patent
eligible subject matter shows by way of example.
The more the law is automated, the less we as a society
will pay attention to and think about the law. This result
might not seem like a problem if the artificial intelligence of
the law is entirely just and well made. But let’s assume,
arguendo, that it is, and that automated law initially works
just fine—or even better than fine; more efficient and more
consistent than when law was in the hands of humans.
Citizens become accustomed to a world in which they simply
obey the law machine. No one is thinking about the law
because the machines do our legal thinking for us.
Is this potential loss of legal thought a problem?
Perhaps not initially, but it could become a very serious
problem if some untrustworthy group of people were to gain
control of the law machine, and start changing its commands
for their own benefit, rather than for the benefit of society.134
violate this condition of legitimacy.”); Emily Berman, A Government of
Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
133 See CLINE, supra note 13, at 50.
134 Cf. TOYAMA, supra note 1, at 29 (“Like a lever, technology amplifies
people’s capacities in the direction of their intentions.”). Potentially, one
way to at least partially guard against this sort of usurpation could be
through the use of decentralized blockchain technology. Cf. Michael
Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 368 (2016)
(“Part I of this article will introduce the concept of peer-to-peer
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It might be difficult to imagine that corrupt people could rise
to power, but the possibility cannot be discounted. And if it
did happen, with the world engrossed in a virtual reality
oasis, simply obeying the law machine in the real world, then
who would notice, and when?
governance by identifying its three critical components: (1) a
decentralized ledger; (2) a decentralized decision; and (3) a decentralized
fisc.”).
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